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Environmental taxation and industrial water 
use in Spain
Jaime Vallés-Giménez * y Anabel Zárate-Marco **
ABSTRACT: The Spanish Water Act, 2001 shifted responsibility for wastewater 
treatment from municipal to regional government, and as a consequence the Au-
tonomous Communities have begun to levy a Sanitation Charge, apparently with 
environmental objectives. Industrial demand for water in Aragon is estimated in 
this paper using a double logarithmic model with panel data to establish whether 
regional Sanitation Charges rationalise water consumption. The key explanatory 
variable is the Sanitation Charge, in addition to the water supply charges payable 
in the towns and cities of Aragon and other variables which capture the character-
istics of the firms in the sample. The reduction in water demand achieved appears 
to be due to the environmental charge rather than to any actual increase in firms’ 
water costs.
JEL Classification: H23; H32; H71.
Keywords: Industrial water consumption; Sanitation Charge; tax centralisation; 
regional government.
Fiscalidad ambiental y uso industrial del agua en España
RESUMEN: Con la Ley de Aguas del 2001, la competencia sobre depuración 
de aguas residuales, que venían desempeñando los municipios a través del cobro 
de tasas, se ha encomendado a las Comunidades Autónomas, quienes deben im-
plantar para su gestión un Canon de Saneamiento. Para determinar si este Canon 
racionaliza el consumo de agua, en este trabajo se estima la demanda industrial de 
agua en Aragón, utilizando para ello un modelo logarítmico con datos de panel en 
el que la variable explicativa clave ha sido el Canon del Saneamiento, además de 
la tasa por el suministro de agua pagada por las industrias en los diferentes muni-
cipios aragoneses, y otras variables que captan las características particulares de 
las empresas de la muestra y que están relacionadas con el consumo de agua. Los 
resultados obtenidos muestran que la reducción del consumo industrial de agua 
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parece debida a la tributación ambiental, más que a un incremento en el coste del 
agua para las empresas.
Clasificación JEL: H23; H32; H71.
Palabras clave: Consumo industrial de agua; Canon de Saneamiento; centraliza-
ción fiscal; nivel regional de gobierno.
1.  Introduction
Widespread public concern about the use of water resources has encouraged gov-
ernments to create mechanisms to improve water management, although they have 
been clearly insufficient. Drought and water shortages are real problems, and pol-
lution from wastewater discharge persists. Meanwhile, non-compliance by several 
member States with the obligations established by the EU Water Framework Di-
rective (60/2000/CE) pushed the European Environment Agency to perform a pilot 
study 1 of the effectiveness of water use and treatment policies in France, Denmark, 
Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Spain, in order to identify and understand policy 
successes and failures.
That study (henceforth EEA Report) suggested that economic instruments and, 
specifically, environmental taxes on industrial discharges, were the best option for 
environmental protection and clearly superior to the command and control instru-
ments that have conventionally been used in this area, though without much suc-
cess. From the standpoint of environmental management, meanwhile, Coch (2001), 
Stavins (2001), Kraemer et al. (2003), Mattheiß et al. (2009), ONEMA (2009) and 
OECD (2011) consider that economic instruments are better than command and con-
trol instruments, because they internalise externalities by including a fee or additional 
cost in the price of outputs and generating extra public funding. They also materialise 
the Polluter Pays Principle, changing users’ behaviour and encouraging eco-efficient, 
rational use of resources. However, other scholars have argued that for an effective 
environmental management all these strategies should be utilized in a harmonized 
manner depending on the strengths and weaknesses of the surrounding economic, 
social and institutional circumstances of the societies such as availability of finan-
cial funds, status of internal market and citizen awareness over environmental issues 
(OECD, 2001; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; OECD, 2007 and Demir, 2011).
The EEA Report found that taxes on wastewater discharges were relatively low in 
Spain and did not produce the necessary stimuli to achieve the desired environmental 
ends, even though regional and municipal authorities are empowered to levy environ-
mental taxes, which can in fact be extremely useful at the lower tiers of government, 
where the power to tax is constrained by the theoretical recommendations of fiscal 
federalism (Dalmazzone, 2006; Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; and Alm and Banzhaf, 2011). 
1  European Environment Agency (2005), Effectiveness of urban wastewater treatment policies in 
selected countries: an EEA pilot study, EEA Report No. 2/2005, Luxembourg.Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  135
The EEA Report also concluded that Spain and France were far from complying with 
the conditions established in the EU Directive, in contrast to Denmark and the Neth-
erlands. Meanwhile, Poland and Estonia (which joined the EU somewhat later) had 
made adequate progress. The success of water use and treatment arrangements in the 
Netherlands and Denmark was found to be partly attributable to the exercise of the 
relevant competences exclusively by a single authority (municipalities or institutions 
entrusted with managing the various hydrographical basins). The effects of sharing 
powers over the use, treatment and pricing of water are apparent in the Spanish case, 
where policy depends on negotiation between the Autonomous Communities or re-
gions and central government 2. The design and levy of wastewater treatment charges 
(i.e. the Sanitation Charge) was devolved to the regions of Spain in the late 1980s, 
and it is the Autonomous Communities that are responsible for compliance with the 
objective of the Urban Waste Water Directive (Council Directive 91/271/EEC).
The Charge levied by the Spanish regions has both an environmental and a finan-
cial purpose. Some regions include the pollution load of industrial wastewater along-
side water consumption in the calculation of the Sanitation Charge, which suggests 
that it can help cut pollution and meet environmental objectives. The EEA Report, of 
course, pays close attention to the of fiscal incentives applied to reduce environmen-
tal pollution, and the main purpose of this paper is therefore to test whether the Sani-
tation Charge actually does reduce water pollution in order to establish whether the 
regional governments of Spain are working in the right direction in the fight against 
pollution, or whether the Sanitation Charge is merely another funding instrument of 
funding with no impact on taxpayers’ behaviour.
For the first time in the literature, therefore, we decouple the price of industrial 
water supplies from the price of pollution discharged in order to look at their separate 
impacts on demand for industrial water. This failure to address what in our view is a 
key empirical issue is a mistake, because the purpose and nature of both prices (water 
supply versus water pollution) are radically different (financial versus environmental 
purpose, and cost versus tax nature).
The paper is structured as follows. The second section contains an in-depth anal-
ysis of the legislation governing water use and taxation in Spain, which is inherently 
complex and emanates from all three tiers of government (central, regional and local) 
more as a regulatory patchwork than a framework. This very legislative profusion 
is probably responsible for some of the errors contained in the EEA Report; for ex-
ample where it asserts that the responsibility for wastewater treatment lies with the 
municipalities in Spain. The third section of the paper describes the measurements 
carried out using a microdata sample to test whether the design of the water-related 
taxes has helped mitigate environmental harm from industrial wastewater discharges 
at the regional level. To this end, we focus on the Sanitation Charge established in the 
Autonomous Community of Aragon, one of the regions that take the pollution load 
2  The industrial structure of water and sanitation utilities may influence policy outcomes. While 
some countries (e.g. England and Wales) have moved towards the aggregation of provision, others (e.g. 
Spain and Italy) have allowed a much more fragmented model to develop.136  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
in discharges into account along with the volume of water consumed to establish the 
amount of the Sanitation Charge payable by industrial water users. The study ends 
with a final section setting out our main conclusions.
2.    A brief overview of European water taxation: 
The case of Spain
Water taxation in the member States is affected by a raft of EU regulations and in 
particular by Directive 60/2000/CE, which creates a European framework for active 
water policies and establishes the cost-recovery principle for water-related service 
costs. Though it does not impose any specific tax measures, the Directive mentions 
that environmental charges could contribute to the attainment of cost-recovery goals 
by ensuring that prices are right. Accordingly, water charges should include all pollu-
tion costs, which are added to the market price of the services by way of surcharges to 
encourage clean production processes through appropriate market reactions. Mean-
while, the system should avoid distorting competition, because the Urban Waste Wa-
ter Directive (271/1991/EEC) obliges all EU member States.
The water charges created by the EU member States (summarised in Table 1) can be 
divided into three categories comprising charges on water abstraction, charges on water 
consumption and sewage treatment services, and charges on water-related pollution.
Let us now consider the Spanish context in greater detail, since Spain is the focus 
of our empirical analysis. The achievement of the cost-recovery principle for water-
related service costs established in the Spanish Water Act (Real Legislative Decree 
1/2001) 3 currently requires a range of charges at both the national and sub-national 
levels, which are set at different points in the complete water cycle. The majority of 
such charges are based on the consumption of a scarce resource, or on the pollution 
produced, or potentially produced, by water consumption and subsequent discharges. 
Charges are thus intended to finance hydraulic infrastructure, whether for water ab-
straction and distribution or for treatment to make used water fit for reuse and con-
sumption. At the level of central government, the amended Water Act establishes a 
Public Goods Charge for Water (paid for the occupation, use and exploitation of 
water-related public goods), a Pollution Charge (to finance the study, control, protec-
tion and improvement of the environment in each river basin), a Water Regulation 
Charge (to cover the benefits obtained from State infrastructure to regulate surface 
and ground water sources), and a Water Use Charge (to finance water infrastructure 
works undertaken by the State to facilitate water availability and use).
These levies are defined from an environmental standpoint, although its green 
influence is weak. The Pollution Charge establishes a pollution-price relationship that 
3  The Spanish Water Act has recently been amended, including changes to art. 111 bis concerning 
cost recovery with the result that cost recovery will henceforth depend on discretionary decisions by the 
competent authority (Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and the Environment). A new law, the Ley de medidas 
urgentes en materia de medio ambiente, or «Urgent Environmental Measures Act» was also enacted on 
December 19th, 2012, in accordance with the provisions of Royal Decree Law 17/2012, of May 4th.Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  137
approximates to the basic Polluter Pays Principle, and the Water Regulation and Water 
Use Charges have environmental objectives insofar as they aim at the rationalisation of 
water use. As Gago and Labandeira (1997) argue, however, the main thrusts of the two 
last Charges are financial, and this limits their environmental effects strictly speaking. 
Table 1.  Water charges in the EU-27
Abstraction Use and discharge Pollution
Austria X
Belgium X X X
Bulgaria X X
Cyprus
Czech Republic X X X
Denmark X X
Estonia X
Finland X
France X X X
Germany X X
Greece X
Hungary X X X
Ireland
Italy X
Latvia X X X
Lithuania X X X
Luxembourg
Malta X
Netherlands X X X
Poland
Portugal
Romania X X X
Slovakia X
Slovenia
Spain X X
Sweden X X
United Kingdom X
Source:
—  OECD/EEA database for environmental policy instruments and natural resources management http://www2.oecd.
org/ecoinst/queries/index.htm).
—  OECD (2003): Task force for the implementation of the Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern 
Europe (EAP), Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members Environment Directorate CCNM/ENV/EAP(2003)22.
—  http://www.economicinstruments.com/.
—  Klarer,  Francis  and  McNicholas  (1999):  Improving  Environment  and  Economy,  Sofia  Initiative  on  Economic 
Instruments, Regional Environmental Centre.138  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
According to Ministerio de Medio Ambiente (1998), meanwhile, the receipts actu-
ally obtained from such charges is very low, accounting for only around 50% of tax 
bills, and collection is often long delayed 4. This hinders recovery of the financial re-
sources necessary for adequate control, administration and maintenance of hydraulic 
infrastructure and for the protection of public water assets. Moreover, it reveals how 
little consumers have internalised process costs. This is important not only in terms of 
revenue generation, but especially for its economic effects on demand. In fact, none of 
the charges encourages users to use scarce hydraulic resources rationally.
It is necessary to distinguish between economic and financial instruments in this 
context. Economic instruments provide incentive to change behaviour patterns, in 
contrast to financial instruments, which are essentially oriented towards cost recovery 
and therefore cannot significantly influence the actions of water consumers (Horbu-
lyk, 2005 and Cantin et al., 2005). In this regard, Horbulyk (2005) stresses the im-
portance of differentiating between the goals behind pricing strategies. Cost recovery 
and efficient pricing are different objectives and may require different instruments. 
In fact, it is far from usual for just one policy instrument to meet the twin goals of 
efficient resource allocation and attainment of public revenue requirements, and the 
choice of instrument therefore needs to be made so as to ensure effectiveness for one 
purpose or the other. Young and McColl (2005) go one step further, arguing that one 
instrument should target no more than one goal, which should be that for which it is 
most effective. It seems reasonable in any event to think of financial and economic 
instruments as complementary and not as substitutes.
At the lowest tier of government in Spain, the Local Finance Regulation Act 
permits Local Corporations to establish charges and public prices for «sewage ser-
vices, and likewise for the treatment and purification of wastewater, including special 
oversight of private sewers» and for the «distribution of water, gas, electricity ..., 
including line connection charges and the installation and use of meters and similar 
devices, when such services or utilities are provided by Local Corporations». These 
are the sole tax figures which municipalities may establish (they cannot fix taxes, 
since they have no legislative capacity); this significantly limits their leeway in pur-
suing environmental objectives, as the overall amount of the charge must be linked 
to the cost of providing the service (Art. 24.1). Alternatively, it must be directly or 
indirectly associated with the cost of mitigating pollution or preserving the resource 
affected. Crucially, however, such levies cannot be used to modify behaviour patterns 
by establishing additional costs via taxation.
4  This is one of the problems inherent in management of water charges by agencies other than the 
national Revenue Service, because they have less enforcement capacity. Furthermore, all of the charges are 
parafiscal items, and therefore they are not integrated with tax and environmental policies but are managed 
and collected by the Confederaciones Hidrográficas (Hydrographical Confederations), the water boards 
responsible for the management of river basins, and other public agencies, which have the authority to grant 
discharge licences. Parataxation is not an area that is naturally suited to environmental objectives, because 
it can encourage «corporate impulses» which are difficult to control and may result in deviations from 
general policy objectives (Rosembuj, 1995). Moreover, revenue collection is problematic, because effective 
enforcement would require the Hydrographical Confederations to forego the very significant support they 
receive from central government control and management structures. This has been a constant in Spain.Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  139
The provisions of applicable legislation appear to favour raising the applicable 
rates of levies subject to direct or objective assessment as a means of introducing 
financial incentives to limit water consumption or reduce the pollution contained in 
wastewater discharges, taking into consideration the financial capacity of the taxpay-
er wherever possible. The situation of municipal water charges remains highly frag-
mented in Spain, although it has become increasingly common to levy charges that 
increase in line with the quantity of water actually consumed. Nevertheless, many 
Spanish municipalities still levy a fixed charge per user. Such charges are not only 
regressive but are also marginally decreasing, so that the more the water consumed 
or discharged, the less is paid for each fiscal unit utilised. Contrary to popular belief, 
moreover, the fact that everybody pays the same is not equitable, as those who con-
sume less water in fact subsidise those who consume more (Field, 1995). In short, 
the current design of water-related charges lacks any environmental objective at the 
municipal level, but is intended rather to finance municipal services, and we may add 
that the impact upon taxpayers is sometimes regressive.
In addition to local charges for the supply of water, sewage services and waste-
water treatment, most of the Spanish regions have by now established a Sanitation 
Charge as a means to meet the objectives of the Urban Waste Water Directive. Mean-
while, responsibility for wastewater treatment, traditionally a matter for local corpo-
rations financed by user charges, was assigned to the regions since the approval of 
the Water Act (although many municipalities still in fact provide the service and will 
continue to do so until the situation of their sometimes considerable legacy invest-
ments can be regularised, the regions assume their new powers in this area, or there 
a regionally financed wastewater purification service of the required quality becomes 
available). The receipt of subsidies from central government for the construction of 
sewage treatment plants was linked to the settlement by the regions of the Sanitation 
Charge. In fact, this charge has in fact become commonest environmental levy found 
at regional level.
In 2011, 15 out of 17 regions are applying a Sanitation Charge with two main 
objectives, namely to reduce wastewater discharges and to finance the capital and 
operating costs of water infrastructure. The Sanitation Charge is usually managed by 
the regional agency responsible for the implementation of wastewater treatment pol-
icy and other activities related to water planning. The public or private water supply 
utilities are required to apply the Sanitation Charge and transfer the receipts obtained 
to the regional agencies, acting as substitutes for the taxpayer and thereby facilitating 
administration and management.
In all regions the Sanitation Charge is levied on wastewater discharges into the en-
vironment. However, it is both difficult and costly to measure the environmental harm 
caused by discharges, and the charge is therefore not applied directly but instead indi-
rectly via the taxation of water consumption. However, some regions have established 
surcharges on the pollution load contained in effluents discharged by industrial users.
As shown in Table 2, nearly all of the regions establish the Sanitation Charge 
payable on industrial water use based on a fixed component (connection charge) and 140  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
Table 2.  Characteristics of regional sanitation charges (Spain) in 2011.  
Industrial uses
First approved
[Last major 
reform]
Fixed Charge Variable Charge Pollution 
load
Andalusia 2010
[2011] €1/month per taxpayer €0.25/m3 per month
Aragon 19971
 [2002]
€16.229 per taxpayer 
per month
Depends on type of 
pollution X
Asturias 1993
[1994]
€5-€1,280 per taxpayer 
per month depending on 
annual consumption
€0.599/ m3 X
Balearic 
Islands
1991
[1992]
€2.4-€420.7 depending 
on meter calibre.
Special tariffs exist for 
hotels, restaurants and 
bars
€0.1472/ m3
Cantabria 2002
[2006]
€14.88 per taxpayer  
per year
€0.3638/m3 or with a 
tariff depending on the 
pollution load
X
Catalonia 19812
[2003]
€0.0927/m3 +  
€0.3633/m3 until 
September (€0.1454/ 
m3 + €0.5702/m3 from 
October)
X
Canary 
Islands 3
1990
[1994]
Depends on pollution 
load and volume of waste 
water
X
Castile- 
La Mancha 20024
0.42€/m3 x factor 
depending on pollution 
load
€0.42/m3 x factor 
depending on pollution 
load
Galicia 1993
[2011]
€2.5 per taxpayer  
per month
€0.421/m3 or another 
tariff depending on 
pollution
X
La Rioja 1994
[2000]
€0.32/m3 x factor 
depending on pollution 
load
X
Madrid 1984
[2003]
€0.0209 twice-monthly x 
factor depending on meter 
calibre
€0.2927-€0.5104  
twice-monthly depending  
on both consumption  
and the pollution  
load
X
Murcia 2000
[2002]
€30 per source of 
supply per year
€0.30/m3 x factor 
depending on pollution 
load
XEnvironmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  141
a variable component (consumption charge). The variable charge is calculated simply 
by multiplying the tax base by the established price. However, the tax base for indus-
trial use is itself commonly determined or changed by the pollution load contained in 
industrial discharges into the river system. This is the case of the Sanitation Charges 
applied in Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Catalonia, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid and Va-
lencia, among others.
What can be said about the environmental utility of the Sanitation Charge from 
an analysis of its constituent parts? On the one hand, it will perform a regulatory 
function as soon as any party responsible for discharges is obliged to pay and, there-
fore, it may help reduce pollution. On the other, though discharges are indirectly 
levied through consumption, the calculation of the quota includes the pollution load 
in the majority of cases, allowing adjustment of the tax base to the harm caused or, 
where appropriate, to the costs of treatment and purification of discharges. Conse-
quently, effective incentives to reduce emissions of pollutants do exist. Nevertheless, 
water consumption elasticity is generally low, which means that charges must be set 
high if they are significantly to reduce water consumption and discharges. Moreover, 
the Sanitation Charge is used to finance the whole of the water cycle in general, and 
its objectives therefore go far beyond implementing the «polluter pays principle», 
including all water management activities, such as the construction of collectors and 
the application of a range of wastewater recycling techniques, revealing the markedly 
financial nature of the tax.
To  conclude,  we  would  emphasise  that  Spanish  legislation  governing  water 
taxation allows for the simultaneous existence of a considerable range of different 
Table 2.  (continue)
First approved
[Last major 
reform]
Fixed Charge Variable Charge Pollution 
load
Valencia 1992
[1993]
€84.54-€2,957.1 per 
year depending on meter 
calibre. This tariff can be 
modified depending on a 
series of factors like the 
pollution load
€0.414/m3. The tariff 
can be modified depend-
ing on a series of factors 
like pollution load
X
Navarre 1988
€0.619/€/m3 x a factor 
depending on the pollu-
tion load
X
Basque 
Country 2008 €0.06/m3
Source: Own work.
1  Subsequently abolished, but approved again in 2001.
2  The Sanitation Charge was actually approved in 1999 as an amalgamation of other levies.
3  Receipts have been transferred to the Island Councils since 1994.
4  The Sanitation Charge did not actually come into force until 2006.142  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
  charges. However, the Sanitation Charge is the only one which could be called an 
  environmental tax. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente (1998) underlines the general 
shortage suffered by the Spanish water supply system and draws attention to the seri-
ous problem of established revenue-generation capacity, is insufficient to meet both 
operating costs and the capital expenditure required. This is especially important, 
because the water cycle requires the creation of new or improved services in Spain, 
and above all in certain arid regions, in order to expand both the supply of drinking 
water and wastewater treatment facilities.
This could be achieved through network modernisation or the implementa-
tion of instruments that allow for the individualised measurement of consumption. 
Such actions require the allocation of significant resources, which in the current 
context of fiscal crisis can only be raised via a rationalisation of existing resources 
or the creation of new environmental charges. The resulting prices must incorpo-
rate all external environmental costs (from the source, through production, dis-
tribution and use, to final elimination) and encourage environmentally respectful 
behaviour.
This is the question examined in the next section. Can rational water use be en-
couraged through consumers’ reactions to tax charges and price in the current de-
centralised context of Spain by establishing environmental charges on industrial dis-
charges (i.e. the Sanitation Charge) and local water supply prices (i.e. Price on water 
supply) at the lower tiers of government.
3.    An econometric model for environmental taxation 
of industrial water uses
This section proposes an explanatory model of industrial water demand, based on 
the environmental taxation of wastewater discharges. It starts by justifying the empir-
ical approach to the topic and summarising existing empirical literature on industrial 
water consumption. Next, it presents the data sources used in the study, the hypoth-
eses tested and the variables employed. The section concludes with a description of 
the specification and the principal results obtained from calculation of the model.
To justify our approach to the subject of environmental taxation of water, let us 
note that until now only Arbués et al. (2010) have estimated industrial water con-
sumption in Spain, although research into domestic and agricultural demand is more 
abundant. Studies of industrial water consumption are also relatively scarce in the 
international literature, and they tend to concentrate on estimating the price elasticity 
of demand, yet they hardly take water charges into account. We have in fact found 
only two empirical contributions which examine the potential consequences of envi-
ronmental taxation in the industrial sector (Reynaud, 2003; and Feres and Reynaud, 
2005). On the other hand, the existing ecological charges, at least in Spain, are of a 
markedly financial nature, and it is therefore essential to test empirically whether 
such charges discourage environmentally harmful behaviour. We consider this to be Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  143
a crucial issue for the design of corrective charges, and the EEA Report underlines it 
as one of the greatest weaknesses in Spanish water pricing policy.
3.1.  A review of the literature on industrial water consumption
Very few analyses of water demand pay attention to the industrial and service 
sectors, even though residential and agricultural demand have been closely studied 
(see the excellent surveys of residential water use published by Arbués et al., 2003 
and Worthington and Hoffman, 2008; and the surveys for agricultural water use by 
Varela-Ortega et al., 1998, and Johansson et al., 1998). Even so industrial water con-
sumption continues to increase and is responsible for the lion’s share of pollution.
The empirical studies described in the literature were carried out in diverse geo-
graphical locations in North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Practically all of 
them share the common objective of determining water price elasticities and output 
elasticity, and many break their findings down by subsectors. The services sector 
has thus normally been studied as a subsector of industry, and only a very few stud-
ies analyse it in isolation (see Schneider and Whitlatch, 1991, or Williams and Suh, 
1986). These studies normally concentrate on manufacturing companies (i.e. on the 
chemicals, textiles, forestry, steel and metals, minerals and food sectors) and ignore 
other industries which also require water for their processes (power stations, mining, 
etc.). Most of these papers also contain two parallel studies, one of them focusing on 
the sample as a whole and the other segmented by branches of activity. However, the 
methods employed differ both functionally and with regard to the explanatory vari-
ables selected and their measurement, and to the econometric techniques employed.
Table 3 summarises key aspects of the principal empirical studies focusing on 
environmental taxation of industrial water use. Some estimate the quantitative de-
mand for water based on its price 5; the prices of other water-related inputs used, 
such as physical capital, energy, raw material or the labour factor; variables which 
do not depend on either inputs or outputs, such as technological change, plant age, 
business sector, state of the technology; the time dimension of the sample analysed, in 
the case of panel data; and the output level obtained. These studies usually consider 
two types of output factor. In the first place, output sensu stricto is expected to have a 
positive impact on water demand, because if water is used to manufacture a product, 
the level of production a firm achieves will probably affect the quantity of water it 
consumes. Secondly, the generation of sub-products (such as the pollution generated) 
will, a priori, have an ambiguous effect on water demand. This is in fact the only way 
5  The question of whether it is preferable to use average or marginal prices has aroused intense con-
troversy. On this point, see Renzetti (1992, 2005a), Espey et al. (1997), Dalhuisen et al. (2003), Arbués et 
al. (2003, 2010), De Gispert (2004), Taylor et al. (2004), Gaudin (2006),Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins 
(2007). Both options have their drawbacks, and various scholars (e.g. Shin, 1985, Nieswiadomy 1992) 
have sought a solution to this dilemma (which also occurs in studies of domestic consumption of water, 
electricity and gas, the prices of which are also structured in blocks). However, it appears that the appropri-
ateness of one or other variable depends upon the sample type, the tax structure, information costs, etc.144  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
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a
r
e
a
 
(
y
e
a
r
)
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
R
e
e
s
 
(
1
9
6
9
)
D
e
m
a
n
d
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
P
l
a
n
t
 
a
g
e
.
S
o
u
t
h
e
a
s
t
 
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
D
e
 
R
o
o
y
 
(
1
9
7
4
)
D
e
m
a
n
d
O
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
L
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
i
n
d
e
x
)
 
a
n
d
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 
(
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
r
 
c
o
d
e
)
.
N
e
w
 
J
e
r
s
e
y
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
n
f
o
r
-
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
3
0
 
c
o
m
p
a
-
n
i
e
s
G
r
e
b
e
m
s
t
e
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
F
i
e
l
d
 
(
1
9
7
9
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
G
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
.
U
S
A
 
(
1
9
7
3
)
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
-
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
B
a
b
i
n
,
 
W
i
l
l
i
s
 
a
n
d
 
A
l
l
e
n
 
(
1
9
8
2
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
G
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
)
;
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
(
s
a
l
a
r
i
e
s
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
u
n
i
t
s
)
.
U
S
A
 
(
1
9
7
3
)
,
 
f
o
r
 
2
4
5
 
fi
r
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
Z
i
e
g
l
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
B
e
l
l
 
(
1
9
8
4
)
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
O
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
P
l
a
n
t
 
a
g
e
;
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
(
d
u
m
m
y
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
-
o
g
y
 
(
d
u
m
m
y
)
.
U
S
A
 
(
1
9
8
4
)
 
f
o
r
 
2
3
 
b
u
s
i
-
n
e
s
s
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
W
i
l
l
i
a
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
S
u
h
 
(
1
9
8
6
)
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
(
l
i
n
e
a
r
 
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
O
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
V
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
u
s
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
U
S
A
 
(
1
9
7
6
)
 
f
o
r
 
8
2
-
1
2
0
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
-
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
R
e
n
z
e
t
t
i
 
(
1
9
8
8
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
G
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
s
e
l
f
-
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
d
,
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
,
 
p
r
e
-
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
,
 
r
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
r
i
fi
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
p
u
t
s
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
s
)
 
a
n
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
a
c
-
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
)
.
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
(
1
9
8
1
)
 
f
o
r
 
3
7
2
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
g
r
e
-
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
R
e
n
z
e
t
t
i
 
(
1
9
9
2
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
G
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
,
 
p
r
e
-
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
,
 
r
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
r
i
fi
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
u
n
i
t
s
)
.
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
(
1
9
8
5
)
 
f
o
r
 
2
,
0
0
0
 
fi
r
m
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
R
e
n
z
e
t
t
i
 
a
n
d
 
D
u
p
o
n
t
 
(
1
9
9
8
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
M
u
l
t
i
s
t
a
g
e
 
L
e
a
s
t
 
S
q
u
a
r
e
s
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
,
 
p
r
e
-
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
,
 
r
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
r
i
fi
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
(
d
u
m
m
y
)
 
a
n
d
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
-
o
g
y
 
(
d
u
m
m
y
)
.
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
 
f
o
r
 
8
8
 
c
o
m
 
p
a
n
i
e
s
W
a
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
L
a
l
l
 
(
1
9
9
9
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
O
L
S
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
u
n
i
t
s
.
)
;
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
e
n
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
u
n
i
t
s
)
;
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
(
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
)
;
 
r
a
w
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
;
 
a
n
d
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
a
-
n
i
e
s
 
(
s
i
z
e
,
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
,
 
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
e
t
c
.
)
.
C
h
i
n
a
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
 
f
o
r
 
2
,
0
0
0
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
O
n
j
a
l
a
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
M
u
l
t
i
s
t
a
g
e
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
,
 
p
r
e
-
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
,
 
r
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
r
i
fi
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
O
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
p
u
t
s
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
s
)
.
K
e
n
y
a
 
(
1
9
9
0
-
2
0
0
0
)
 
f
o
r
 
5
1
 
p
l
a
n
t
s
R
e
n
z
e
t
t
i
 
a
n
d
 
D
u
p
o
n
t
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
G
L
S
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
.
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
n
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
n
d
)
;
 
p
h
y
s
i
-
c
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
(
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
)
;
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
)
;
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
)
;
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
r
a
w
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
;
 
a
n
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
/
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
)
.
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
(
1
9
8
1
,
 
1
9
8
6
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
1
)
 
f
o
r
 
5
8
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
R
e
n
z
e
t
t
i
 
a
n
d
 
D
u
p
o
n
t
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
 
G
L
S
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
s
e
l
f
-
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
.
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
-
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
(
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
)
;
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
(
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
g
a
s
,
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
,
 
f
u
e
l
,
 
e
t
c
.
)
;
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
s
a
l
a
r
y
)
;
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
n
o
n
-
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
/
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
i
n
d
e
x
)
 
;
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
(
d
u
m
m
y
)
.
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
(
1
9
8
1
,
 
1
9
8
6
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
1
)
 
f
o
r
 
5
8
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
F
e
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
y
n
a
u
d
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
r
e
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
d
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
)
;
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
f
fl
u
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
d
e
m
a
n
d
 
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
)
;
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
-
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
n
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
)
;
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
c
o
s
t
)
;
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
(
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
)
;
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
(
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 
t
y
p
e
 
(
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
r
 
c
o
d
e
)
.
S
a
o
 
P
a
u
l
o
,
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
 
(
1
9
9
9
)
 
f
o
r
 
4
0
4
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
d
a
t
a
R
e
y
n
a
u
d
 
(
2
0
0
3
)
C
o
s
t
s
 
(
t
r
a
n
s
l
o
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
)
G
L
S
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
s
e
l
f
-
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
d
,
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
-
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
f
fl
u
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
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in which the literature (Reynaud, 2003; and Feres and Reynaud, 2005) has included 
environmental pollution in water demand estimations 6.
Some studies calculate firm’s production levels (in physical or monetary units) on 
the basis of input quantities, while others estimate firms’ minimum production costs 
by analysing input quantities, the output level and the type of activity and technology. 
Finally, a considerable number of papers estimate the production costs incurred by 
firms to obtain their output on the basis of the input prices used and even the quantity 
of water consumed.
With the exception of the demand function, which can be analytically specified in 
a linear, logarithmic or double-logarithmic functional form, the remaining functional 
forms are specified via a translog model. The results obtained in the literature for 
the water price show that industrial water demand is price inelastic. The reasons for 
these common findings are that water has very few or no substitutes, it is cheap and 
it represents only a small share of total costs. However, industrial water price elastic-
ity is greater than in the domestic or agricultural sectors (Renzetti, 2005a; Reynaud, 
2003; or Williams and Suh, 1986). This is reasonable given that industry can seek 
alternative sources (pre-treated, recirculated or purified water) or it can recycle water 
in production processes to adapt to any hike in the price. This suggests that any price 
policy implemented to allocate water to competing uses will be more efficient if it is 
applied to the industrial use of water 7.
3.2.  Hypotheses tested
The hypotheses estimated in this study were set based on the above review of the 
literature. Given that the aim of this study is to test whether the Sanitation Charge 
reduces water pollution through water consumption in industry, a number of other 
explanatory variables were considered in addition to the Sanitation Charge. These 
comprised the price of water, the output level, the fixed capital of the firm, the aver-
age salary, other raw materials, technological level and company age. Finally, this pa-
per seeks for the first time in the literature to separate the effects of the price paid for 
water supplies and of the price paid for pollution in water discharges on the demand 
for water for industrial use. It is this distinction that will allow us to draw conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the Sanitation Charge in the fight against pollution.
The starting-point for this empirical analysis was the data contained in Aragon 
Sanitation Charge Census supplied by the Instituto Aragonés del Agua for 2002 and 
2003. The Census provides annual information on the volume of water consumed 
by each firm, the fixed tax rate and the tax rate applicable for the calculation of the 
6  These sub-products have been measured using environmental indices or variables associated with 
the ecological charges paid.
7  According to Vermeend and Van der Vaart (1998, industrial use of underground water in the Neth-
erlands declined after the introduction of a water abstraction tax.Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  147
Sanitation Charge 8, and the resulting tax liability. The Aragon Sanitation Charge 
Census contains data for 284 firms in 2002 and 299 in 2003, comprising all those 
that actually paid the charge. We may note here, however, that not all of the region’s 
municipalities were subject to the Sanitation Charge in the years examined (includ-
ing, for example, the city of Zaragoza) and others were allowed 50% rebates 9. Dis-
appointingly, the Census does not include other economic and financial data for the 
firms concerned. This information was supplemented by data from SABI (Iberian 
Balance Sheets Analysis System), a database containing economic and financial de-
tails of some 500,000 Spanish and Portuguese firms, in order to obtain annual data 
and for each company on the other variables included in the model (employees, 
salaries, profits, output, etc.).
Companies were excluded if the information obtained from either of the two 
databases was incomplete, resulting in a sample of 87 firms for both 2002 and 2003. 
As information on the source (supplied or self-abstracted) of the water used by each 
firm is available, we were able to calculate the fee or price payable by those compa-
nies using supplied water (i.e. the water supply price). This meant reviewing the tax 
regulations which established the price for water consumption in each municipality 
where the sample firms were established in the years studied. To be precise, we de-
termined the fixed tax rate, marginal tax rate and fixed and variable charges payable 
in respect of water supplies by each firm in 2002 and 2003. Figure 1 classifies the 
8  The tax rate takes into account the wastewater pollution load.
9  See BOA (Official Gazette of the Autonomous Community of Aragon) of June 29, 2005.
13
10
7
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
11
10 5 0 15
12
CNAE 93. Personal service activities
CNAE 91. Activities of memberships organizations
CNAE 90. Sewerage
CNAE 85. Human health and veterinary activities
CNAE 80. Education
CNAE 70. Building activities
CNAE 65. Financial brokerage
CNAE 63. Activities incidental to land transportation
CNAE 60. Land transport
CNAE 55. Accomodation and food and beverage service activities
CNAE 51. Wholesale trade and agents involved in the sale of...
CNAE 50. Sale and repair of motor vehicles
CNAE 40. Production and distribution of electricity, gas, steam and...
CNAE 36. Manufacture of furniture
CNAE 34. Manufacture or motor vehicles
CNAE 31. Manufacture of machinery and electrical equipment
CNAE 29. Manufacture of machinery and power-driven equipment
CNAE 28. Manufacure of metal products, except machinery and...
CNAE 26. Manufacture of other non metallic mineral products
CNAE 25. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
CNAE 24. Chemical industry
CNAE 21. Manufacture of paper
CNAE 20. Manufacture of wood and cork, except furniture and...
CNAE 15. Manufacture of food products and beverages
CNAE 14. Extraction of non metalic and non energy minerals
Figure 1.  Distribution of activities by CNAE-93 branches.  
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87 sample firms by activity according to the 1993 Spanish National Classification 
of Economic Activities (CNAE in the Spanish acronym), which defines branches 
1 to 45 as industrial activities, accounting for 44 of the sample firms, and branches 
50-95 as service sector activities, accounting for 43 firms.
The  sample  firms  are  distributed  across  all  branches  of  activity. The  industrial 
branches containing largest number of firms are food and beverages (CNAE-15), with 
12 companies, and metal products manufacturing except machinery and equipment 
(CNAE-28), with 11 companies. The other firms are distributed among the 11 remaining 
branches. In the service sector, the hotels and restaurants branch (CNAE-55), with 13 
companies, and sale and repair of motor vehicles (CNAE-50), with 10 companies, are the 
most numerous. The remaining companies are distributed among the other branches.
Panel data were used to solve the problems inherent in time series-based econo-
metric studies, because this technique allows the use of fewer periods (2002-2003) and 
makes it easier to assess the differences in the behaviour of the 87 sample firms. Mean-
while, data are expressed in real terms, deflated by the consumer price index to get 
around the difficulty posed by comparison of the same variables over time. The vari-
ables utilised, their symbols, sources and expected signs are summarised in Table 4 10.
In this context, we shall try to establish the extent to which municipal water 
prices and sanitation charges on wastewater discharges have discouraged water con-
sumption by Aragonese firms 11. In addition, we shall consider the possible influence 
on water consumption of certain characteristics of the sample firms (fixed capital, 
technology, company size, production volume and consumption of other commodi-
ties), which have also been examined in the literature.
Water consumption in the Aragonese industrial sector, is proxied by the number 
of cubic metres demanded by each company (WUSEit); subindex «i» is allocated to 
each of the 87 companies and the subindex «t» to each financial year (2002-03).
a)    Price of water (WPRICEit): The aim is to determine the extent to which 
the water prices paid affect industrial demand for water in Aragon, since it 
is easily predictable a priori that water will display negative price elasticity. 
This hypothesis is tested using the average price per cubic metre in constant 
euros or, alternatively, the marginal price of water paid by each firm.
b)    Environmental taxation of water (GREENCHARGEit): The aim is to es-
tablish whether the environmental charge paid by firms actually creates the 
necessary disincentives for the use of water as a scarce good, consumption of 
which produces negative environmental effects. This variable is constructed 
in alternative forms in order to accommodate both the average tax rate and 
the marginal tax rate (of the Sanitation Charge) paid by each firm. It is ex-
pected to be negative.
10  The tables contained in the Appendix provide information regarding the most important descrip-
tive statistics and the correlation matrix of the principal variables (tables 1.A and 2.A).
11  For the sake of simplicity, we refer to industrial use of water to mean the use of water by industry 
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In the case of industrial water use, firms can differentiate clearly between the 
price paid for water consumed and the Sanitation Charge, allowing perfect visu-
alisation of the environmental tax. Hence, there is no chance of firms confusing 
the price of water with the environmental charge, because the management and 
inspection procedures applied by the Instituto Aragonés del Agua in relation to the 
Sanitation Charge are independent of billings in respect of the management of the 
water actually consumed. This is because the firms are required to contract officially 
authorised firms to measure both the volume of wastewater and the pollution load 
as necessary factors for the calculation of the Sanitation Charge payable by each 
firm 12. Hence, there can be no doubt that the Sanitation Charge is perfectly visible 
for firms.
12  Firms are required to file form model 883 (Statement of water uses, pollution load and employ-
ment conditions) with the Instituto Aragonés del Agua, so they are perfectly aware that the volume of 
water consumed and the pollution load are the factors determining the amount of the Sanitation Charge 
payable. If the firms must also pay a price for water supply, the Instituto Aragonés del Agua bills the price 
for water supply and the Sanitation Charge as separate items in the same invoice.
Table 4.  Definition, expected sign and source of the variables
Symbol Hypothesis Expected 
sign
Source
WUSEit
Number  of  cubic  metres  of 
water demanded by each com-
pany.
Aragon  Sanitation  Charge 
Census. Aragonese Water Ins-
titute.
WPRICEit
Price  elasticity  of  water  de-
mand. –
Own calculation from the reg-
ulations  governing  the  water 
supply prices in each munici-
pality.
GREENCHARGEit
Fiscal  disincentives  created 
by  the  ecological  tax  on  wa-
ter  consumption  (Sanitation 
Charge).
–
Aragon  Sanitation  Charge 
Census. Aragonese Water Ins-
titute.
FIXCAPITALit
Relationship  between  fixed 
capital and water demand. Indefinite Iberian Balance Sheet Analy-
sis System (SABI).
AVEWAGEit
Cross-elasticity  of  water  de-
mand and salaries. Indefinite Iberian Balance Sheet Analy-
sis System (SABI).
RAWMATit
Relationship  between  con-
sumption of commodities and 
water demand.
+
Iberian Balance Sheet Analy-
sis System (SABI).
OUTPUTit
Water  demand  elasticity  with 
regard to output. + Iberian Balance Sheet Analy-
sis System (SABI).
INTANASSit Technological level. – Iberian Balance Sheet Analy-
sis System (SABI).
COMPAGEit Company age. + Iberian Balance Sheet Analy-
sis System (SABI).150  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
c)    Use of fixed capital (FIXCAPITALit): Firms’ water consumption and 
their fixed capital may display a complementary relationship when in-
creased water demand is accompanied by more intensive use of plant and 
equipment. However, investment in fixed capital can also reduce water 
consumption, resulting in substitutability of the two production factors. 
Individual firms’ fixed capital is measured by the value of their tangible 
fixed assets, expressed in thousands of euros and in constant terms. The ex-
pected sign of this variable is ambiguous, although most empirical studies 
have in fact found a substitutability relation between water consumption 
and fixed capital.
d)    Employment (AVEWAGEit): This variable relates average wages to water 
consumption, since almost all empirical research reviewed, with the excep-
tion of Kumar (2006), has found a substitutability relation between water 
consumption and employment, although complementarity may exist in some 
cases for reasons of scale or company size. The variable is constructed as the 
coefficient of staff costs divided by the firm’s headcount. A positive sign is 
expected.
e)    Other raw materials (RAWMATit): Given the low substitutability of water 
by other factors of production, this variable tests there is any complementar-
ity between water consumption and the use of other inputs, drawing on exist-
ing empirical studies. The consumption value of other productive factors is 
thus estimated in terms of expenditure on raw materials in constant euros. 
The relationship between water demand and operating expenditure should 
be positive.
f)    Output level (OUTPUTit): Given the production function underlying all 
industrial activity, a positive relationship must exist between the level of 
output and the productive factors employed (including water consumption) 
as all the research reviewed has indeed found. Moreover, this variable is 
closely related to company size and the number of employees, as the corre-
lation coefficient between these variables confirms. The output variable has 
been constructed as the value of operating revenue in constant euros. Water 
demand elasticity in relation to output should be positive.
g)    Technological level (INTANASSit): This variable was included in the model 
given that the use of the most advanced technology available reduces water 
consumption. The value of intangible assets expressed in constant euros is 
used as a proxy for a firm’s technological level. A negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable.
h)    Company age (COMPAGEit): Obsolescence of a firm’s plant may entail 
reduced efficiency in the use of water. Hence, the influence of a company’s 
longevity upon water demand is likely to be positive, as older facilities con-
sume more water. The variable was constructed using the difference between 
the years of the study and the year in which each of the sample firms was 
established.Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  151
 
3.3.  Specification of the model and principle results
Having analysed the different hypotheses to be tested, let us now turn to the 
specification of the model. The aim is to determine the relationship between wa-
ter consumption and the Sanitation Charge (among other variables). As explained 
above, water consumption by Aragonese firms should be explained by the Sanitation 
Charge, the price paid for water, and a set of variables which capture firms’ individual 
characteristics in relation to water consumption. Considering the set of possible func-
tional forms (demand, production, costs and distance), a double logarithmic demand 
function is used 13, given that the main aim of the study is to estimate the impact of the 
Sanitation Charge . To this end, the logarithmic model estimated for industrial water 
consumption, using panel data, is as follows:
WUSEit = D(WPRICEit, GREENCHARGEit, FIXCAPITALit, AVEWAGEit, 
RAWMATit, OUTPUTit, INTANASSit,COMPAGEit) [1]
The logarithmic estimation of the model of industrial water consumption in Ara-
gon using Ordinary Least Squares shows problems of autocorrelation, heterosce-
dasticity and endogeneity 14. For this reason, feasible generalised least squares were 
used. The results are shown in the first two columns of Table 5.
As may easily be observed, water price (WPRICE) can contribute to the efficient 
management of the resource, because the higher the average price paid by companies, 
the less water they demand. The same process occurs if the marginal price is em-
ployed as a proxy for the water price. Nevertheless, demand price elasticity is clearly 
lower than 1 (inelastic demand), and the percentage variation in demand is therefore 
lower than the percentage variation in the price. The magnitude of price elasticity is 
similar to the estimations obtained by the majority of international studies of water 
demand (–[1.1/0.1]) (see Dalhuisen et al. (2003), Arbués et al. (2003), Arbués, el at 
(2004 and 2010) or Worthington and Hoffman (2006)).
This inelastic behaviour is associated with the scarcity or absence of convenient 
substitutes in many fields of water use. It may also be due to low water prices (spend-
ing on water consumption is very small as a proportion of total business costs), or it 
may be that a significant number of the firms in the sample are self-supplied, either 
from wells or direct abstraction from nearby sources, paying only an initial sum of 
around €85 the administrative concession but nothing at all for the volume of water 
13  The double-log functional form yields direct estimates of elasticities (Williams, 1985) and (Dandy 
et al., 1997). It also leads to a constant-elasticity form of demand. This implies that the proportional 
sensitivity of use to price changes is the same for low and for high prices. Nevertheless, the use of this 
functional form has been criticised because of its lack of consistency with utility theory (Al-Quanibet and 
Johnston, 1985). See Arbués et al. (2003)
14  The Hausman test was used to analyse the exogeneity of the explanatory variables, and empirical 
signs were obtained of the possible endogeneity of the WPRICE and GREENCHARGE variables, which 
is a logical result as Williams and Suh (1986) and Renzetti (1988, 1992) argue.152  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
consumed. This is perhaps why we did not find that industrial demand for water is 
more price-sensitive than available estimates of agricultural and residential demand, 
contrary to the results published by Williams and Suh (1986) and Renzetti (2003).
Table 5.  Logarithmic estimation of the model, using Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares for industrial water consumption in Aragón
Marginal values Average values
Marginal values 
with industrial 
activities and 
time dummies
Average values 
with industrial 
activities and 
time dummies
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
WPRICE –0.009*
(–1.80)
–0.012**
(–2.44)
0.008
(1.61)
0.006
(1.37)
GREENCHARGE –0.555**
(–7.42)
–0.667**
(–7.08)
–0.602**
(–5.15)
–0.355**
(–3.79)
FIXCAPITAL 0.443**
(10.41)
0.456**
(10.62)
0.003
(0.06)
0.019
(0.39)
AVEWAGE –0.383**
(–3.27)
–0.370**
(–3.09)
0.165
(0.66)
0.573**
(2.29)
RAWMAT 0.007
(0.28)
0.004
(0.17)
–0.133**
(–5.56)
–0.127**
(–5.38)
OUTPUT 0.299**
(4.86)
0.301**
(4.84)
0.856**
(9.81)
0.809**
(9.58)
INTANASS –0.036**
(–5.88)
–0.035**
(–5.68)
–0.014**
(–2.14)
–0.013**
(–2.03)
COMPAGE 0.503**
(3.99)
0.470**
(3.73)
0.956
(0.69)
0.104
(0.72)
D-ACTIVITIES1 0.426
(0.68)
0.231
(0.37)
D-ACTIVITIES2 –1.359**
(–2.41)
–1.914**
(–3.23)
D-ACTIVITIES3 –1.811**
(–3.41)
–2.117**
(–3.69)
D-ACTIVITIES4 3.364**
(4.71)
2.953**
(4.01)
D-ACTIVITIES5 –7.072**
(–6.79)
–7.691**
(–7.14)
D-ACTIVITIES6 –0.184
(–0.29)
–0.881
(–1.35)
D-ACTIVITIES7 1.749**
(3.60)
1.344**
(2.65)
D-ACTIVITIES8 –3.332**
(–5.88)
–3.891**
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Table 5.  (continue)
Marginal values Average values
Marginal values 
with industrial 
activities and 
time dummies
Average values 
with industrial 
activities and 
time dummies
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
D-ACTIVITIES9 –0.878
(–1.53)
–1.438**
(–2.36)
D-ACTIVITIES10 0.824
(1.29)
–0.589
(–0.87)
D-T2003 –0.258**
(–2.98)
–0.254**
(–2.96)
Observations 174 174 174 174
R2 0.838 0.838 0.874 0.874
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.830 0.859 0.858
F-statistic 107.63** 107.44** 56.48** 56.29**
*  Significantly different from 0 at a confidence level of 90-95% in the bilateral test.
**  Significantly different from 0 at a confidence level of 95-99% in the bilateral test.
Meanwhile, the Sanitation Charge (GREENCHARGE) displays a negative and 
significant sign for both average and marginal tax rates, and it therefore does con-
tribute to the rationalisation of water use. In addition, the results obtained are in 
the higher range of estimations available for the price elasticity of agricultural and 
residential consumption (Williams and Suh, 1986 and Renzetti, 2003). As Renzetti 
(2005b) argues, then, the reduction in water consumption is due to the environmental 
charge and not to the increase in firms’ water costs. This may be because the cal-
culation of the Sanitation Charge takes the wastewater pollution load into account. 
However, it is also possible that this result is influenced by cost-free access to water 
in those cases in where firms supply themselves by self-abstraction, and by the price 
subsidies enjoyed by the rest.
The results obtained for the relationship between water consumption and the use 
of other productive factors were in line with expectations. Thus, a complementary 
relationship can be established between water use and firms’ physical capital (FIX-
CAPITAL) and employment (indirectly through AVEWAGE), while the complemen-
tarity between water use and operating costs (RAWMAT) was not found to be signifi-
cant. The complementarity between fixed capital and water consumption indicates 
that greater investment in capital goods is accompanied increased demand for water 
in the firms concerned. In the case of employment, it is size or scale which motivates 
complementarity.
The relationship found between industrial water use and the level of output (OUT-
PUT) means that water can be defined as a normal good, that is to say as a reflection 154  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
of the underlying production function, which relates the quantity of a specific product 
manufactured to the quantities of the productive factors required. Once again, the 
elasticity presents similar values to those obtained in the various international studies 
available (0.34/1.94).
Likewise, there is apparent empirical evidence to suggest that those firms which 
invest most in research and development (INTANASS) also use the best water-saving 
technologies, thereby helping to reduce water consumption. Furthermore, the posi-
tive coefficient obtained for the variable which captures company age (COMPAGE) 
indicates that the deterioration or obsolescence of physical capital decreases techni-
cal performance and impairs efficient water use.
The model was also calculated including dummies for similar business activi-
ties and time dummies in order to capture the possible influence of characteristics 
from each one of the sectors and the economic cycle 15. Some results change when 
these additional factors are included in the model (shown in the last two columns 
of Table 5), allowing us to check the robustness of the variables used in the mod-
el. To begin with, the price of water (WPRICE) is no longer significant. While this 
result could be taken to reinforce our previous reflection about the inelasticity of 
water consumption, it may also reflect weakness in the design of the water supply 
tariff 16, which has traditionally been viewed as a «political» (i.e. subsidised) price. 
Hence, the water price should be reconsidered given the obligations imposed by EU 
Urban Waste Water Directive, in order to eliminate the «political» pricing of water 
services, address environmental issues and finance a more complete and expensive 
service. Meanwhile, the relationship between water consumption and the operating 
costs (RAWMAT) is negative and significant, which suggests, contrary to what was 
expected in theory, that there is some substitutability between water and other inputs. 
Physical capital (FIXCAPITAL) and company age (COMPAGE) cease to be signifi-
cant in this expanded model, and the employment (AVEWAGE) variable also loses 
some significance and switches from positive to negative. The influence of these 
variables on water consumption in industry is therefore sensitive to the specifica-
tion of the model, while the results remain robust for GREENCHARGE, OUTPUT 
and INTANASS. Finally, the time dummy is negative, revealing a downward trend 
in industrial water consumption, although a longer time series would be needed to 
establish the medium-term time effect. Dummies capturing the branches of activ-
ity are generally significant and show that paper manufacturing and accommodation 
activities consume the most water, while the production and distribution of energy, 
wholesale trade and transport consume the least.
15  Table 3.A. of the Appendix shows the activities included in each sector dummy. Although 
our time series comprises only two years, we have also included a time dummy for 2003, in order to check 
if there was any change in the economic cycle during the period considered which might have influenced 
the model.
16  See Barberán et al (2006 and 2008).Environmental taxation and industrial water use in Spain  155
 
4.  Final considerations
The growing concern in advanced societies over environmental problems, and 
specifically over the use of scarce resources like water justifies intervention by the 
regulator to improve management. Various intervention mechanisms exist to protect 
the environment (regulations, property rights, environmental taxes, etc.), but taxation 
offers many advantages compared to other tools. This paper has analysed the effec-
tiveness of the Sanitation Charge levied on industries in the Aragon region of Spain 
in correcting the environmental problems caused by discharges of wastewater (leav-
ing aside financial aims). This issue demands attention in view of the gravity of the 
potential environmental impacts from industrial water use in respect of other urban 
and agricultural uses. It was also one of the main motivations for the research behind 
this paper, together with the absence of empirical studies on the subject, owing to the 
difficulty of obtaining the necessary information, and the need to identify the design 
issues that must be addressed to set an effective corrective tax.
One of the basic design problems affecting the Sanitation Charge is the con-
nection between tax base and environmental damage. The conventional way to 
address such a link is by indirectly taxing the production of wastewater discharges 
into the environment (i.e. through the consumption of water from any source), as-
suming that water consumption is associated with the generation of wastewater. 
From the corrective effectiveness, we consider that the pollution load of industrial 
wastewater has a crucial role to play as a modulating factor in the calculation of the 
tax payable, together with the intensity or magnitude of the charge itself. In some 
Spanish regions, including Aragon, the pollution load of wastewater for industrial 
uses is taxed together with the volume of water consumed, so that the composition 
or quality of the water discharged is taken into account in the calculation of the 
Sanitation Charge payable by each firm. We believe this is a key aspect of envi-
ronmental tax design, so that the case of Aragon is representative of an effective 
corrective tax.
In order to achieve the aim proposed for this study, the price paid for water pol-
lution was for the first time separated from the price paid for water supplies in the 
estimation of water demand. This split differentiates our paper from published stud-
ies of water demand, and we believe it is essential given the differing purpose and 
nature of the two prices.
The results obtained for the Autonomous Community of Aragon show that the 
reduction achieved in industrial water consumption is due rather to the Sanitation 
Charge than to any increase in water supply prices. This suggests that the Aragonese 
Sanitation Charge is well designed, because it changes polluters’ behaviour. This out-
come is associated both with the intensity of the Sanitation Charge and a tax design 
which modulates the tax charge based on the environmental damage caused by the 
taxpayer. Whether the stimulus achieved through the Sanitation Charge is sufficient 
from an environmental standpoint is another question.156  Vallés-Giménez, J. y Zárate-Marco, A.
Nevertheless, the result is constant regardless of the model specification (i.e. 
whether marginal or average prices are used), and whether or not dummies are in-
cluded to capture the possible influence of sector characteristics and the business cy-
cle on industrial water demand. Meanwhile, the coefficient for the price of the water 
supply (WPRICE) ceases to be significant when dummies are included, reinforcing 
the hypothesis that water consumption is price inelastic, although it may also reflect 
weaknesses in the design of the water supply tariff.
Our empirical study also sought to capture the possibility that increasing demand 
for water in industry may be due to output growth (scale effect) and to changes in 
the productivity of water consumption (technological effect). To this end, we have 
included variables reflecting both the volume of production (OUTPUT) and the lev-
el of technology used in the activity (INTANASS) alongside our key variable (the 
Sanitation Charge) and price variable (price for water supply). All of these additional 
variables explain water demand and are robust to the inclusion of sector dummies (D-
ACTIVITIESX) intended to capture the influence of changes in the industrial fabric 
of the region on water demand (composition effect). In any event, the effect of the 
output variable will clearly depend on the internal use of water in a given firm (reused 
and recycled water etc.) However, it seems logical to suppose that a longer time series 
would be required for industries to take up new water-saving technologies, and for 
water consumption and pollution to be reduced by their use.
This study could be extended by comparing the environmental effects of the 
Sanitation Charges applied in other regions of Spain, and this paper may therefore 
be considered a base for future research. Considering the differences observed in the 
Sanitation Charges applied by the Autonomous Communities, it might be appropriate 
for central government to establish mandatory tax design criteria in order to ensure a 
minimum level of environmental quality throughout Spain.
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Table 3.A.  Activities included in sector dummies
D-ACTIVITIES   1.  Manufacture of food products.
D-ACTIVITIES   2.  Manufacture of vehicles, machinery and metal products.
D-ACTIVITIES   3.  Chemical industry and manufacture of plastic, wood and rubber products.
D-ACTIVITIES   4.  Manufacture of paper.
D-ACTIVITIES   5.  Production and distribution of energy.
D-ACTIVITIES   6.  Sale and repair of motor vehicle.
D-ACTIVITIES   7.  Accommodation.
D-ACTIVITIES   8.  Wholesale trade, intermediaries and transportation.
D-ACTIVITIES   9.  Real estate activities and financial mediation.
D-ACTIVITIES 10.  Services provided to the community and other social activities.